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OPMIONS - CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - MISDEMEANANT'S RIGHT TO
CouNsEL: LEGISLATIVE INACTION RESOLVES CONSTITUTIONAL DOUBTS?
-- Hendrix v. Seattle, 76 Wn. 2d 142, 456 r.2d 696 (1969).
Since Gideon v. Wainwright1 was decided, a major question has
been: to what crimes does the indligent's2 constitutional right to trial
counsel at public expense extend? The Washington and Oregon Su-
preme Courts recently considered the question and reached conflicting
results.
In Oregon, the defendant was charged with the crime of disorderly
conduct, a misdemeanor,' and convicted in the Municipal Court of
Portland. On appeal the Oregon Supreme Court reasoned that repre-
sentation by an attorney is a "necessary ingredient of a fair trial
regardless of the seriousness of the crime,"4 and that "if the sixth
amendment requires the appointment of counsel for indigent misde-
meanants in the federal courts, it must require like appointment in the
state court." 5
In Washington, the defendant was arraigned before the Seattle
Municipal Court on two separate charges of disorderly conduct, a mis-
demeanor.6 His request for counsel on grounds of indigency was denied
and he was subsequently convicted and sentenced to serve 180 days
consecutively on each charge. Upon review, the superior court held
that indigents have a constitutional right to appointed counsel. But,
upon appeal, the Washington Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that
"[W]here reasonable doubts exist as to the constitutional duty or
prohibition affecting the legislative branch of government, they should
be resolved in favor of the legislature's action or inaction." Hendrix v.
Seattle, 76 Wn.2d 142, 145-46, 456 P.2d 696, 700 (1969) (5-4
decision).
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963); See generally Morris, Poverty and Criminal Law, 38 WASH.
L. REV. 667 (1963); Junker, The Right To Counsel In Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WASH. L.
Rtv. 685 (1968); Comment, Continuing Echoes Of Gideon's Trumpet-The Indigent
Defendant And The Misdemeanor; A New Crisis Involving the Assistance of Counsel
in "A Criminal Trial," 10 S. TEx. L. J. 222 (1968).
2. See Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings
and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 Msne. L. RFv. 1, 17-33 (1963), for a discussion of
standards for determining indigence.
3. PoRTLA -D, ORE., PoLicE CODE § 16-601 (1960).
4. Application of Stevenson, - Ore. -, 458 P.2d 414, 417 (1969), noted in 9
WAsHBUmR L.J. 469 (1970).
5. 458 P.2d at 418.
6. SEATT'z, WAsH., CODE § 12.11.020 (1969).
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The different results reached by the two courts are not easily ex-
plained. There seem to be no significant differences in the state con-
stitutions.7 Neither court had any significantly different constitutional
or policy arguments presented to it.' Nevertheless, the Oregon Su-
preme Court found a constitutional right to appointed counsel for
indigent misdemeanants and the Washington Supreme Court, using a
formula for judicial restraint, concluded the Constitution confers no
such right. It is the purpose of this note to evaluate the Washington
court's treatment both of the federal constitutional issue and of public
policy questions; and to discuss whether deference to the legislature
is appropriate in either context.
I. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
Applying the formula of restraint that doubts about the existence
of a constitutional duty affecting the legislature are to be resolved
in favor of legislative inaction,9 the Hendrix court set out to determine
whether a "doubt" about the indigent misdemeanant's constitutional
right to appointed counsel arises from narrow interpretations of
Gideon v. Wainwright" in United States Supreme Court cases" and
denials of certiorari 12 subsequent to Gideon. After concluding that a
doubt regarding the constitutional right exists, the court purported to
look to the legislature for the resolution of the doubt since the legisla-
7. WASH. CONST. amend. X provides:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend
in person, or by counsel, . . . to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury
of the county in which the offense is charged to have been committed and the right
to appeal in all cases....
ORE. CONST. art. I, § 11 provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right . . . to be heard by
himself and counsel ....
8. The only difference with regard to the policy aspect of the cases was a study cited
in the Stevenson respondent's brief indicating the yearly cost to the state of Oregon for
appointing counsel for indigent misdemeanants would be less than $350,000. See appendix
A to brief of Respondents at 107-114, Application of Stevenson, - Ore. -, 458 P.2d 414
(1969).
9. 76 Wn.2d at 145-46, 456 P.2d at 700.
10. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) holding that the sixth amendment's right to counsel applies
to the states through the due process clause of the 14th amendment. Gideon was a
felony case.
11. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See notes
18-20 and accompanying text, infra.
12. Winters v. Beck, 239 Ark. 1093, 397 S.W.2d 364 (1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 907(1966); DeJoseph v. Connecticut, 3 Conn. Cir. 624, 222 A.2d 752 (1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 982 (1966). See text accompanying notes 23-31, infra.
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ture is affected.13 Legislative inaction on the matter apparently pointed
the court to the conclusion that there is no constitutional right.
It would appear that the court, in looking to the legislature for
resolution of the "doubt," may be suggesting that a court should defer
the responsibility of resolving constitutional questions to the legisla-
ture.14 Of course the legislature, theoretically, considers the constitu-
tionality of every enactment, but the final interpreter of the consti-
tution has traditionally been the courts. The judiciary has a special
competence in the area of constitutional adjudication. 15 When a
constitutional question, involving particular litigants, comes before
a court, the court is under a duty to resolve the issue'0 rather than
to refer the parties to the legislature, or to defer to the legislature the
resolution of the issue.
Although the Washington court's formulation of the doctrine of
judicial restraint could lead one to the conclusion that the court was
deferring to the legislature the resolution of a constitutional question,
in the final analysis the court did not follow its own formula. Dis-
cussion of the constitutional issue concluded:1 7
We are of the opinion, therefore, that although everyone ac-
cused of a crime has a right to counsel, he does not have a con-
stitutional right to counsel at public expense when charged with
a misdemeanor in municipal court; and the municipal court is
under no constitutional duty to supply counsel at public expense
in misdemeanor prosecutions....
The conclusion expressed in this language seems to be assumed in the
court's subsequent discussion of policy considerations. Thus, one is
led to conclude that the court, in fact, decided the Constitution, as
presently interpreted, does not compel recognition of a right to ap-
pointed counsel for misdemeanants, and, after considering policy
questions, decided that the doctrine of judicial restraint required the
13. In concluding its discussion of the constitutional issue, the court said: "Whether
counsel shall be supplied in such cases is left by the constitutions, we think, to the
legislative and not the judicial branches of government."
76 Wn.2d at 153, 456 P.2d at 704.
14. justice Rosellini's dissent notes this problem. 76 Wn.2d at 168-69, 456 P.2d at
712-13.
15. See Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society-Judicial
Activism or Restraint?, 54 CoaRNr L. Rlv. 1, 24 (1968).
16. Id. at 6.
17. 76 Wn.2d at 153, 456 P.2d at 704.
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court to defer to the legislature for the creation of such a right as
public policy may demand.
Such an approach can be criticized on two grounds. First, the court
did not convincingly resolve the constitutional question, and second,
even assuming no constitutional right exists, it was of questionable
propriety to defer the policy issue to the legislature.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE
The court rested its apparent conclusion that there is no constitu-
tional right on two grounds: 1) a narrow reading of Gideon found in
post-Gideon cases; and 2) the denial of certiorari by the United States
Supreme Court of cases involving the counsel for misdemeanants issue.
It is true that Gideon involved a felony and the conventional anal-
ysis would interpret Gideon to apply only to felony cases. It is also
true that cases subsequent to Gideon such as Mempa v. Rhay'8 and In
re Gault 9 referred to Gideon as establishing the right to appointed
counsel in felony cases. However, the argument can be made that the
scope of the constitutional right to counsel is not limited to felonies
by Gideon and subsequent cases. The subsequent interpretations could
be read to describe the established right in felony cases and not
necessarily to limit the right to felony cases.20 Even if one accepts
the position that Gideon did not extend the right to misdemeanants,
21
its rationale could have been applied in Hendrix. Certainly a mis-
demeanant, just as a felon, does not have the necessary skill to prepare
his defense adequately. 2 Not only did the Washington court fail to
18. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
19. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
20. In Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967), Mr. Justice Marshall said: "[I]n
Gideon v. Wainwright . . . this Court held . . . that there was an absolute right to
appointment of counsel in jelony cases." (emphasis added). In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 29
(1967) the court said:
If he had been over 18. . . . [h]e would be entitled to clear advice that he could
be represented by counsel, and, at least if a felony were involved, the State would be
required to provide counsel if his parents were unable to afford it.
21. See Junker, The Right to Counsel In Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WAsH. L. REv. 685,
691 (1968) where he says:
It is clear by this time, however, that what was once in doubt-whether Gideon
itself ruled cases such as Winters and DeJoseph-was no longer in question, the
ambgiuty having been resolved against inclusion of misdemeanor offenses.
22. Id. at 692.
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explain why this reasoning does or does not apply to the misdemeanant,
but the court did not even consider Gideon's rationale.
In relying on United States Supreme Court denials of certiorari, the
Washington court admitted that traditionally such denials have no
substantive significance,' but reasoned that because strong dissents
were written to denials of certiorari in Winters v. Beck 24 and Deloseph
v. Connecticut,25 those denials are not without importance. To appre-
ciate the court's error in relying on denials of certiorari, one need only
consider the case of Winters v. Beck.
Defendant Winters was convicted of a misdemeanor 28 and sentenced
to thirty days in jail and fined $254.00, but since he was an indigent,
he was required to serve 284 days in jail as provided by the Arkansas
"dollar-a-day" statute.2 7 His petition to the Supreme Court of Arkansas
was denied and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari .2
Winters then filed for a writ of habeas corpus. The United States
District Court decided that although the sixth amendment does not
require the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in all mis-
demeanor cases, counsel should be appointed for Winters, since he
was not charged with a "petty offense."'29 The United States Supreme
Court again denied certiorari in the habeas corpus proceeding. s0 Given
the dissimilar results in the state and the federal proceedings, both of
which were refused review at the highest level, it is obvious that one
cannot maintain that by denying certiorari the United States Supreme
Court has indicated an opinion. A denial of certiorari is, at best, neutral
on an issue 1
III. PUBLIC POLICY
Even if one were persuaded by the Washington court's conclusion
that existing interpretations of the constitution do not compel appoint-
ment of counsel for misdemeanants, its reasons for deferring to the
23. 76 Wn.2d at 146, 456 P.2d at 700.
24. 239 Ark. 1093, 397 S.W.2d 364 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 907 (1966).
25. 3 Conn. Cir. 624, 222 A.2d 752 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 982 (1966).
26. Little Rock, Ark., Code § 25-121 (1961).
27. Ark. Stats. Ann. § 43-1203 (1964).
28. 385 U.S. 907 (1966).
29. 281 F. Supp. 793 (E-D. Ark. 1968).
30. 407 F.2d 125, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 963 (1969).
31. See Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912 (1950).
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legislature to establish a right based on the demands of public policy
are not convincing. Analogizing from the fact that Congress passed the
Criminal Justice Act,32 providing counsel for misdemeanants in federal
cases, the court concluded that it is exclusively within the legislature's
jurisdiction to decide whether indigent misdemeanants should be pro-
vided with counsel. 3 However, the right to counsel in misdemeanor
cases was recognized in lower federal courts before Congress acted. 4
Refusing to formulate even a serious/minor offense distinction, the
Washington court discussed at length the many different Seattle ordi-
nances, and concluded that it would be difficult to define and administer
a right to counsel using a case-by-case approach. 5 Difficulty of ad-
ministration is certainly a factor to be considered, but one wonders
how much weight it should be given as against a defendant's interest
in an adequate defense. Further, that various statutory schemes exist
may be one reason for concluding that the problem should be solved
on a case-by-case approach locally.
The argument upon which the Washington court seemed to rely
32. 18 U.S.C. § 3006-A(b) (1964).
33. To support this view the Hendrix court related that the legislature has the power
to define and classify crimes. 76 Wn.2d at 155, 456 P.2d at 705. It is difficult to
appreciate this argument. No one would doubt that the legislature has the power to de-
termine the elements of a particular crime, and to establish the punishment for its
commission. However, when a court decides that certain "crimes" require the appointment
of counsel it is not usurping the legislature's prerogative to define and classify crimes.
If one were to accept the court's argument, one would have to conclude that the
United States Supreme Court was without authority to decide, in Bloom v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 194 (1968), that certain "serious crimes" require a jury trial if the defendant so
requests. See also State v. Towne, 64 Wn.2d 581, 392 P.2d 818 (1964) ; Baker v. City of
Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970).
34. Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942). See also Harvey v. Mississippi,
340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965), where the court appointed counsel for a defendant who was
fined $500 and sentenced to ninety days in jail.
35. See 76 Wn.2d at 158, 456 P.2d at 707, where the court said:
Aside from our questionable power to direct this, the inevitable consequence of
such a policy will compel the busiest courts in our judicial system to proceed, case-
by-case, to study carefully innumerable cases in advance of trial and ascertain not
only whether the offense charged shall be classified as serious or minor, but also
whether the defendant on trial will, upon conviction, deserve a serious or minor
sentence.
Compare Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970), with Hendrix to see
the Alaska court's reasoning contra to Hendrix on the problem of classifying cases.
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most heavily is that an increased tax burden would result were the
court to declare that such a right existed: 86
The decision to provide any of these services without cost in
courts of limited jurisdiction, we think, should not be preempted
by the courts but left with that branch of government which has
the power to levy taxes, appropriate the moneys and employ and
pay the personnel essential to do the job.
However, the court failed to meet respondent's argument that the
legislature may have indicated it is looking to the courts for definition
of the right to appointed counsel. 7 In 1965 the Washington legislature
amended R.C.W. § 10.01.110, which provided for funds for attorneys
who are appointed to defend indigent felons. The amendment added
the proviso38 "that this section shall apply to such other proceedings
and at such other times as may be constitutionally required." Argu-
ably, the statute would not provide funds for municipal courts, and
the amendment refers to requirements of the Constitution, not to judi-
cially created rights based on public policy. However, the basic view
is expressed that the courts should determine when counsel should be
provided, and provides a partial answer to the court's concern for
fiscal matters.
The dominant theme in Hendrix is the court's concern with the
doctrine of judicial restraint-deferring to legislative "action or inac-
tion ' 39 when the legislature is affected.
Though the court decided the constitutional question, deference to
inaction-the legislature's failure to provide expressly for appointed
counsel for indigent misdemeanants-may well have tipped the balance
36. 76 Wn.2d at 163, 456 P.2d at 709-10. See Baker v. City of Fairbanks, supra note
35, for an argument rejecting this in terrorem approach in a case involving the right to
jury trial in misdemeanor cases.
37. Brief for Respondent at 23, Hendrix:
[T]he Legislature recognized, as its Proviso indicates, that the right to counsel is
not primarily a legislative but a constitutional question. The Legislature sought
only to deal with the mechanics of the appointment of counsel and to provide for
the compensation of counsel appointed to represent indigents. It recognized that
the right to appointed counsel might be constitutionally required in other proceed-
ings and at other times. Accordingly, it expressly made the benefits of RCW 10.01.110
applicable to such other situations to avoid the necessity of enacting new legisla-
tion as the right to counsel was expanded to include situations not in terms covered
by the section.
38. WAsH. REv. CoDE § 10.01.110 (1965).
39. See text accompanying note 15, supra.
191
Washington Law Review
in the determination. It is submitted that the court should not defer
to legislative inaction at all, since courts so acting are thereby "shift-
ing the responsibility to an institution which has already evaded it,
or at least refrained from assuming it."4 Legislative inaction may
mean41
no more than that the legislature has not considered the problem.
It may mean that there shall be no change in the law. It may
mean that it has concluded that the principles and rules should
be evolved by the courts....
Or the legislature may have acted for a variety of narrow
political reasons not related to public policy, the popular will, or
public needs.
The courts should be very careful to determine in what instances a
legislature is likely to conclude "that the principles and rules should be
evolved by the courts." One area where such legislative inaction might
well be interpreted as deference to the courts is when constitutional
questions are involved. As indicated above,4 2 the judiciary has tradi-
tionally been the interpreter of the Constitution, so it is not unlikely
that the legislature would defer to the courts in this area of special
competence.
The Oregon court analyzed the merits of the constitutional problem.
40. Hart, Comment On Courts And Lawmaking, in LEGAL IN'STrrUTIoN s TODAY AND
To o Row 40, 47 (1959).
41. Breitel, The Courts and Lawmaking, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND TomiOaaow
1, 12 (1959) ; For another discussion of the legislative method of deferring to the courts
see Breitel, Lawmakers, 65 CoLum L. REv. 749, 762 (1965).
42. See text accompanying note 15, supra.
43. Compare Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wn.2d 759, 458 P.2d 897
(1969), a decision decided subsequent to Hendrix in which the same four justices--
Finley, Rosellini, Hill, and Hamilton-again dissented, seeming to accept the argument
that in certain instances the court should not defer to legislative inaction.
In Halvorson the plaintiff sued an employer for personal injuries caused by an em-
ployee who had become intoxicated at his employer's Christmas party. The court held
that the employer was not liable for injuries caused by* his employee, concluding:
It may be that the social and economic consequences of "mixing gasoline and
liquor" should lead to a rule of accountability by those who furnish intoxicants to
one who becomes a tortfeasor by reason of intoxication, but such a policy decision
should be made by the legislature ...
76 Wn.2d at 765, 458 P.2d at 900. But Justice Finley in dissent argued that:
Legislation is not required and never has been. The instant case is one peculiarly
suited to the judicial process ....
Legislative inaction is not proof of inexorable social or public policy.
76 Wn.2d at 768, 458 P.2d at 902. He urged that the judiciary has a special competence
in the area of tort law and should assert its responsibility.
192
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The Washington court's treatment of the constitutional issue, colored
by its predilection for restraint, involved only the mechanical applica-
tion precedent. There was no due process analysis. Certainly an appeal
to determine whether the lower court was correct in deciding that due
process requires counsel be appointed should make some reference to
the demands of due process.44
In the discussion of whether public policy compels judicial recog-
nition of a right to appointed counsel for misdemeanants, the Washing-
ton court engaged in what could be one-half of a due process analysis.
The issues of administrative difficulty and cost were properly con-
sidered. However, the court undertook no analysis of the costs imposed
on Mr. Hendrix and those similarly situated in being deprived of
counsel. Evidently the court was striving to accommodate the doctrine
of separation of powers, but it reached an accommodation by a one-
sided approach to the merits of the issue raised by the respondent. The
state's problems were thoroughly discussed. The respondent's position
was not.
Finally, whatever may be said of the court's handling of the issue
presented as a matter of public policy or its analytical omissions in
deciding the constitutional issue, one apparent underpinning of its
decision is more disturbing. For the court it was virtually dispositive
that the United States Supreme Court has not held an indigent mis-
demeanant has a right to appointed counsel. Admittedly that Court is
the ultimate arbiter, but that the Washington court looks to the United
States Supreme Court rather than to Congress confirms that the con-
stitutional issue is for judicial determination.
The Oregon court used a rationale provided by the United States
Supreme Court to extend constitutional coverage to a situation on
which the latter has not yet directly ruled. The Washington court,
eschewing any use of tools of constitutional analysis, refused to con-
clude that the protections of the Contitution extend beyond where
the United States Supreme Court has explicitly held they extend.
44. The Washington Supreme Court did not discuss the issue of equal protection. If
a court were going to resolve the constitutional question adequately, it should consider
the argument that denying a person the right to counsel on grounds of poverty would
violate the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause as interpreted in Grifin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
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Therein lies the fundamental difference between the approaches taken
by the two state courts. 5
In a federal system, state courts should be involved in the develop-
ment of constitutional law, particularly where issues are of substantial
local interest and where local conditions vary. The United States
Supreme Court, should it determine to decide the issue of the mis-
demeanants' right to appointed counsel, will not be able to draw on the
Washington court for a balanced analysis of what due process may
require in that context.
45. See Baker v. City of Fairbanks, supra note 35, for an Alaska decision extending
United States Supreme Court holdings on right to jury trial for misdemeanants.
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Vol. 46: 185, 1970
